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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1994 from the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission and the leader of the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the high-level talks between the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the one hand, and the Government of Iraq, on the other, held in New York from 14 to 19 March 1994. We should be most grateful if you could issue instructions for its circulation as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
United Nations Special Commission

(Signed) Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader
IAEA Action Team

Appendix

Report on the high-level talks held between Iraq, on the one hand, and the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other

New York, 14-19 March 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of the high-level dialogue between the Government of Iraq and the organs of the United Nations charged with the implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) initiated during the visit to Baghdad of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in July 1993, a further round of high-level talks was held between Iraq, on the one hand, and the United Nations Special Commission and IAEA, on the other, over the period from 14 to 19 March 1994.

2. Two plenary meetings, led by General Amer for the Iraqi side, were held on 14 and 15 March 1994. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq arrived in New York on 15 March, holding separate meetings with the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Leader of the IAEA Action Team on 17 and 18 March 1994 respectively. In addition, 24 meetings were held at the technical level during this period.

3. The Iraqi delegation comprised the following: Tariq Aziz (Deputy Prime Minister), Amer Rashid (Head of the Iraqi Military Industries Authority), Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, Sami Gatie, Hosam Amin, Hamid Ibrahim, Ghazi Najmaldin, Basil Mohammed, Sami Al-Araji, Serour Mahmoud and Sabah Hamad.

4. The Special Commission was represented by Rolf Ekéus (Executive Chairman of the Special Commission), Charles Duelfer (Deputy Chairman of the Special Commission), Henry Arvidsson, Rachel Davies, David Dorn, William Eckert, Amelia Jones, John Larrabee, Patrice Palanque, Annick Paul-Henriot, Jim Poarch, Horst Reeps, Michel Richard, Mark Silver, Nikita Smidovich, Tim Trevan and Andreas Zaugg.

5. The IAEA Action Team was represented by Maurizio Zifferero, Leader of the Action Team, Berhanykun Andemicael, Garry Dillon, Laura Rockwood and Paul Stokes.

II. POLITICAL TALKS

6. During his meetings with the Special Commission and IAEA, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq repeatedly stated that, in the view of the Government of Iraq, the ongoing monitoring and verification regime was already in place, that Iraq had completed all the actions contemplated of it under paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and hence that it was incumbent upon the Commission and IAEA to report forthwith to the Security Council that the

conditions for the lifting of the oil embargo had been met. He demanded to know when the Special Commission and IAEA would consider the ongoing monitoring and verification system to be in place and when reports under paragraph 22 would be made. He said that the Government of Iraq had concluded that, because such reports had not already been made and no date had been set for such, it could not trust the Executive Chairman or the Special Commission to act objectively in the pursuit of their mandate. He asserted that the Executive Chairman and the Commission were acting out of political motives inconsistent with their mandate. He indicated that serious consequences could ensue if the Commission did not act accordingly.

7. The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission outlined the Commission's approach as follows. Any report to the Security Council reporting full compliance with the terms of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) would have to be on the basis of:

(a) The Commission having full information of Iraq's prohibited programmes allowing for a definitive accounting of them;

(b) The establishment of effective ongoing monitoring and verification and the ability of the Special Commission to ensure that its ongoing monitoring and verification plan could be implemented in a manner that would ensure that prohibited programmes could not be reactivated clandestinely.

8. During the technical talks, Iraq had sought, by providing new data, to address the Commission's main outstanding concern - a full accounting of Iraq's former chemical weapons programme. Those new data were welcomed by the Commission. However, there was still the problem of how they could be independently verified by the Commission. The Commission had made suggestions how to address that problem. The Commission continued to discuss with Iraq questions arising from the Commission's investigations into information provided by Iraq on the suppliers of prohibited items.

9. The Executive Chairman pointed out that Iraq had not yet completed all the actions contemplated in paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) as there still remained the large task of putting in place the system of ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by the Security Council. Doing so would require many additional actions on the part of Iraq.

10. The initiation of those actions had been delayed by Iraq's failure, until November 1993, to recognize the Council's plans, themselves adopted in October 1991 by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and due to enter into force at that time. The Commission had been ready to initiate implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification at any time Iraq accepted the resolution. Indeed, immediately upon Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), the Commission had taken steps to expedite the provision by Iraq of the full initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification by providing Iraq with prepared formats in which such declarations should be made to assist Iraq in fulfilling its reporting obligations.

11. The initial declarations under resolution 715 (1991) had been received from Iraq in mid-January 1994. In certain areas, they provided sufficient

information to conform with the requirements of the plan. Where that was the case, the Commission had acted without delay to launch baseline inspections and to draft site baseline inspections and to draft site monitoring and verification protocols. A first such major baseline inspection was beginning its work by the end of March. In those areas where the new declarations did not provide full information, the Commission had tried to speed up the process in order to bring the declarations into conformity with Iraq's reporting obligations, thereby permitting the process to be launched in those areas too.

12. The key to the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification was Iraq's initial declarations - ongoing monitoring and verification must be conducted on the basis of information provided by Iraq to constitute the baseline information for such activities. Without that baseline information from Iraq, the Commission could not undertake useful ongoing monitoring and verification. Thereafter, the establishment and operation of ongoing monitoring and verification would require the full support and cooperation of Iraq at each stage and on a continuing basis.

13. The current status of ongoing monitoring and verification was that the Commission would be launching its first series of baseline inspections in March and April respectively for ballistic missiles and biological activities. While plans were under development for chemical baseline inspections, a date for sending a team to Iraq had not yet been set and was pending the receipt from Iraq of adequate baseline information. During the talks, that had been one of the two major issues discussed, and the Commission hoped that Iraq, in accordance with an undertaking given in the course of the talks, would very soon address the major inadequacies of its earlier initial declarations in the chemical area. Depending on the availability of experts, the Commission would be able to launch chemical baseline inspections shortly after the receipt of adequate initial declarations from Iraq.

14. Once the baseline inspections were concluded and sensors and tags were installed, the Commission should be able to implement ongoing monitoring and verification forthwith. It should prove possible to install sensors and tags within the framework of baseline inspections.

15. As regards IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification regime, the Leader of the Action Team informed the Deputy Prime Minister that, while elements of the plan had already been phased in, others remained to be implemented, as detailed in the enclosure to the present report. He reaffirmed IAEA's position that it would report to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) only after it was satisfied that it was in a position fully to implement its plan.

16. For the Special Commission and the Action Team of IAEA, the situation was very clear: their mandate was that of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations. Their only objectives were to fulfil, to the satisfaction of the Council, their technical mandates as soon as feasible.

III. TECHNICAL TALKS

17. As noted above, technical talks were held in each of the four weapons categories. They concentrated on plans for implementing ongoing monitoring and verification, with the Iraqi side pushing for timetables by which each activity would be complete. The Commission and IAEA explained what their current intentions were for conducting such activities but pointed out that, in most instances, the speed with which they could proceed was dependent upon Iraqi actions, especially in relation to the provision of information. The Commission explained in detail in each of its areas the modalities it intended to use for ongoing monitoring and verification, including the types of sites to be monitored, and the types of sensors and tags to be used.

18. In both the chemical and the ballistic missiles areas, talks also covered past weapons programmes. In the chemical weapons area, talks covered the importation of raw materials and equipment for the production of chemical weapons and a detailed breakdown of precursor chemical imports against production capacity and actual production of chemical warfare agents. In the ballistic missiles area, talks covered the expenditure of SCUD-derivative missiles and information arising from the Commission's investigations into Iraq's missile and related equipment supplier network (see enclosure).

Enclosure

Technical talks

A. Missile issues

1. The missile working group had seven meetings to discuss the issues related to ongoing monitoring and verification, forthcoming inspection activities and Iraq's disclosures of prohibited programmes.

2. The primary focus was on ongoing monitoring and verification. The Special Commission outlined to the Iraqi side current activities to establish as soon as feasible a workable mechanism and practical modalities for monitoring pursuant to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991). That included the assessment of Iraq's initial declarations submitted under the plan, identification of sites to be monitored and appropriate monitoring technologies and preparation of ongoing monitoring and verification protocols with specific guidelines for future monitoring inspections. The Iraqi side informed the Commission of its efforts to support the early establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism. They included trial exercises to familiarize Iraqi personnel with the monitoring modalities envisaged under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and to gain experience in support of monitoring activities.

3. During the talks, progress was made in the identification of facilities and specific items to be monitored. Useful discussions were held on sensor technology, including cameras and tags to be used for monitoring. The Iraqi side submitted additional reports on a number of facilities identified by the Commission for monitoring. The Commission welcomed the work being done by the Iraqi side to facilitate the early establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism. A schedule of forthcoming missile-related activities was provided to the Iraqi side. Iraq promised continued cooperation with the Special Commission and outlined specific contributions that the Iraqi side be prepared to make at each stage of establishing the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism under resolution 715 (1991).

4. Based on the results of the Commission's investigation of information on foreign suppliers of prohibited items submitted previously by Iraq, the Commission asked the Iraqi side to clarify some issues. Iraq reaffirmed that all prohibited items that had been imported by Iraq had been fully reported to the Commission and it had nothing substantial to add. Some further information, including identification of specific suppliers and supplier's network, was provided by Iraq and could assist the Commission in its efforts to have a complete understanding of Iraq's past programmes and in its further investigations.

5. The Commission also continued discussions with Iraq on the past expenditure of prohibited missiles in order fully to understand the documentation recently provided by Iraq on that subject. As a result, Iraq undertook to submit to the Commission a new declaration with a precise accounting of all prohibited missiles obtained and used by Iraq. The new declaration is to substitute the

relevant portion of the "Full, final and comprehensive report on ballistic missile activity" submitted by Iraq in May 1992.

B. Chemical issues

6. In the course of nine meetings, the Iraqi side presented additional information about its past chemical weapons programme. This included data on the importation of precursor chemicals and a time correlation between declared production quantities of chemical warfare agents, imported precursor chemicals and installed production capacity. These new data were based on additional efforts by Iraq (instigated at the Commission's insistence) to collect indirect substantiation of the facts and figures contained in its declarations. In the absence of documentation, the Iraqi side interviewed in early February additional senior Iraqi personnel associated with the past chemical weapons programme, among them the former head of Al Muthanna for the period from 1981 to 1987. The new data concerning precursors are partly based on barrel counting and partly on calculations. This information seems credible, and provides an accounting of Iraq's past programmes that is more internally consistent than previous accounts. However, further evaluation by the Commission will require its experts to hold discussions with those former Iraqi officials recently interviewed by the Iraqi authorities.

7. As Iraq had failed to complete fully the formats for its initial declaration in the chemical area, the Commission once again explained in detail how these formats should be completed. Emphasis was placed on what was expected of Iraq in relation to questions not answered in its January 1994 declarations. In particular, Iraq was asked to prepare completed formats for sites identified by the Commission as requiring baseline inspections but for which Iraq had yet to submit baseline data in the form of initial declarations.

8. During the talks a letter was handed to Iraq from the Commission, containing the Commission's decisions on the fate of chemical production equipment associated with Iraq's past programmes. During the last meeting, the Iraqi side presented improvised plans for the future use of some of the dual-use equipment concerned. The Iraqi side was asked to provide the Commission with detailed plans for the use of each item of equipment by 30 April 1994 at the latest.

9. Finally, the Iraqi side presented data it felt could constitute site protocols for 15 chemical sites. Iraq drew on the model of a site protocol prepared by the Commission for the Ibn Al-Baytar facility. These will be evaluated for their applicability to the Commission's needs.

C. Biological activities

10. The biological working group held three meetings. The main issues discussed were the formats in which Iraq should make the initial and regular reports on biological activities due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification; monitoring and verification protocols for biological sites to be monitored; Iraqi suggestions for modalities to be used in biological monitoring

and verification activities; and the Commission's plans for conducting such activities.

11. The Commission informed the Iraqi side that it intended to conduct a series of biological baseline inspections starting in April 1994, to include all of the sites declared by Iraq in its initial declarations. A full description of the Commission's plans for implementing ongoing monitoring and verification is found in the attachment to the present document.

12. As had been agreed earlier, the Commission handed to the Iraqi side a revised version of the formats for Iraq's declarations due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. The differences between this version and earlier ones were highlighted and the reasons for them explained. Iraq was asked to ensure that its initial declarations cover the period required by the plan, namely 1 January 1986 to July 1993, and to provide a six-monthly declaration for the period 15 July 1993 to 15 January 1994. At the request of Iraq, it was given an electronic copy of the revised formats.

13. Iraq explained actions it had taken in preparation for ongoing monitoring and verification, including the drafting of "preliminary formats for the monitoring and verification protocol" for 16 of the declared biological sites. While these were accepted by the Commission, Iraq was notified that the Commission's biological baseline inspection team would draw up protocols specifically designed for the biological area which might differ greatly from those prepared by Iraq, as the latter were based on the Commission's chemical monitoring and verification protocols.

14. Iraq also presented its ideas on how ongoing monitoring and verification might be conducted in the biological area. It had prepared monitoring suggestions for three of the declared sites and presented its findings on one - a vaccine production institute. The modalities proposed included interviews with key site personnel, material balance accounting, sample-taking, checks of quality controls and inventories, availability of documentation and records (both medical and personnel) to inspectors, and camera monitoring.

D. Nuclear issues

15. The IAEA representatives and the Iraqi nuclear team reviewed the progress made in recent months, with particular reference to the verification of the information provided by Iraq on suppliers of material and equipment and the sources of technical advice. A review was also made of the other information required to be provided by Iraq under the terms of IAEA's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, with a view to identifying still outstanding matters.

16. IAEA referred to the letter dated 13 October 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General (see S/26584, annex), by the Director General of IAEA, in which was detailed the position of IAEA in the light of the outcome of the high-level technical talks held in Baghdad from 30 September to 8 October 1993. In that letter, the Director General explained that the long-requested critical information concerning suppliers of prohibited and other material and the

sources of technical advice, finally provided during that round of high-level technical talks, had to be verified for accuracy and completeness before Iraq would be regarded as having complied with all of the disclosure requirements concerning its nuclear activities. In the letter, the Director General also stated that, before the Agency would be ready to report Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), IAEA would have to satisfy itself that it was in a position to implement fully the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, which would also require the prior receipt from Iraq of the data foreseen in the annexes to the IAEA plan.

17. IAEA acknowledged the progress achieved thus far in the corroboration of the information provided by Iraq on suppliers and sources of technical advice and expressed its confidence that this verification could be completed with the assistance of Member States within a short time. It also acknowledged the Iraqi efforts to complete the information required under the provisions of the annexes to the plan. It was concluded that, as far as the information requirements were concerned, the necessary actions were close to satisfactory completion.

18. As regards the full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, discussions were held on ways to achieve an expeditious phasing in all of the remaining measures contemplated in the plan. The possibility was envisaged of Iraq sending to Vienna a technical delegation to provide clarifications useful to IAEA in its finalizing of the inspection protocols for each facility/installation/site relevant to the plan.

19. IAEA also indicated that it would proceed to the deployment of surveillance equipment, which entailed the identification of optimal locations for the placement of such equipment, the installation of the equipment and the assurance of its proper functioning. That would be achieved through the dispatch by IAEA of specialized teams dedicated to such purposes. It was suggested that a reasonable target for completion of such activities, as currently contemplated, under optimal circumstances might be, at a minimum, a matter of three to four months. Confidence was expressed that, by adopting such an approach, and assuming the continued full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, the time needed for IAEA to assure itself of its ability to implement its plan fully would be minimized.

20. The Iraqi team expressed its strong wish for a specific date by which IAEA would submit to the Security Council the report of Iraq's technical compliance with the relevant paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991). IAEA referred to the outstanding actions which would need to be completed before it would be in a position to conclude that such a report was possible, as outlined above. It was recognized that IAEA was in a different position from the Special Commission in so far as IAEA had already started phasing in elements of its long-term monitoring plan and that, as a consequence, the IAEA report could well precede that of the Special Commission. However, the IAEA representatives stated that it would not be possible or practical to provide a specific date by which that might happen.

Attachment

Activities planned by the Special Commission to implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification

A. Introduction

1. The Special Commission intends to conduct its ongoing monitoring and verification activities in accordance with its plan, approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (see S/22871/Rev.1).

2. This plan requires Iraq to make initial declarations about its dual-purpose activities covering a period before the Gulf War to the present date. It is also predicated on the Commission having the full, final and complete disclosures of Iraq's prohibited programmes as required under Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 (1991). Together, these two sets of declarations make up the baseline data on which ongoing monitoring and verification activities are to proceed. Without these data, the Commission cannot guarantee that its ongoing monitoring and verification activities will be effective. These data on dual-purpose activities are also to be updated every six months by Iraq.

3. On the basis of these data, the Commission assesses Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities in all areas of relevance to the plan. From this assessment, which is an ongoing process given the dynamic nature of the Iraqi industrial base, the Commission identifies sites, equipment and materials that may need to be monitored. In parallel, the Commission has sought, and will continue to seek, to identify technologies that would assist in the monitoring process in each area, to increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the regime.

4. Having identified the items of potential interest to ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission intends to launch baseline inspections at each relevant site in order to verify the Iraqi declarations, to assess how the items of interest should be monitored (including the most relevant technologies to be used), and to draw up a monitoring and verification protocol for each site so inspected. These protocols will contain, inter alia, a description of the site and of the items or activities of interest to ongoing monitoring and verification and prescriptions for the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification at that site. On the basis of these recommendations and after review of them at the Commission's headquarters in New York, decisions will be made on the most appropriate form of ongoing monitoring and verification for each site and the relevant sensors, recording devices, seals or tags installed. Thereafter, ongoing monitoring and verification activities will proceed on the basis of the site monitoring and verification protocols, as amended over time to reflect changes to the sites concerned, to the items contained therein or of the activities conducted thereat.

5. In order to expedite this process, the Commission has conducted a number of seminars at its headquarters in New York with international experts. These seminars have sought to identify ways and means of conducting ongoing monitoring and verification in the most efficient manner consistent with effectiveness and

to assess the current status of the Commission's knowledge about Iraq's past programmes and current dual-purpose capabilities.

6. Furthermore, the Commission is in the process of recruiting additional personnel to ensure adequate resources for the added work brought about by Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), in November 1993, and the process of initiating ongoing monitoring and verification. So far, two additional biological experts have been recruited, as have one chemical and one missile expert. Recruitment has been initiated for a further three chemical experts and one biological and one missile expert. In addition, the Commission is seeking to recruit an expert on sensor technologies and three data collators to assist in the processing of the very large quantities of data generated by the ongoing monitoring and verification process. Additional computing capacity has been purchased and plans are in place to establish a monitoring centre in Baghdad.

B. Activities currently planned

1. Missile-related activities

7. Based on the overall concept for establishing ongoing monitoring and verification under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), the following activities in the missile area are envisaged:

(a) Protocol-building:

(i) A team will be tasked to prepare draft site monitoring and verification protocols for a number of facilities to be monitored in Iraq. The team will prepare guidelines related to ground inspections and submit recommendations for sensor monitoring and tagging at each facility that will be visited;

(ii) The team will visit all facilities identified to date as being subject to monitoring except for sites that are abandoned or under construction. The team will not conduct any activities related to operational missiles;

(iii) The current planning for this inspection provides for arrival of the team in Iraq on 30 March 1994. The team will continue its work through a succession of rounds of visits to Iraq until the accomplishment of all its tasks. It is anticipated that this will take at least two months;

(b) Monitoring sensor installation:

(i) Based upon recommendations of the protocol-building team, decisions will be taken by the Special Commission on specific sensor packages that will be installed at facilities to be monitored. The configuration of sensor packages will depend on the type of facility, level of activities and other relevant factors. Currently camera systems and tags have been identified as available and suitable technologies to assist monitoring;

(ii) After decisions are taken to install specific sensors at specific facilities, a procurement process will start. The Special Commission is currently establishing contacts that will allow rapid procurement once decisions are taken;

(iii) Once sensors are procured, a team will go to Iraq to start the installation of sensors. The installation operation may require several visits to Iraq. It is anticipated that the installation operation may start before the end of May;

(c) Tagging of missiles:

(i) In accordance with the ongoing monitoring and verification plan under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), monitoring covers missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres;

(ii) The Special Commission is currently working on operational procedures to ensure the safety of tagging activities. The completion of these procedures will require coordination with Governments that are expected to supply personnel for this operation;

(iii) Once the safety issues are resolved and appropriate training is conducted, a team will be sent to Iraq to begin tagging operations. Owing to the significant number of missiles involved and safety requirements, it is anticipated that several visits will be required to complete the tagging operation. These visits will also include surveys of the relevant facilities.

2. Chemical activities

8. The Commission is currently installing in Iraq chemical sensors on a trial basis. If successful, additional sensors could be installed near dual-purpose sites. These sensors would be able to detect trace elements of chemicals in the effluents of chemical facilities, which in turn would indicate the types of chemicals being produced at the said site.

9. In April, the Commission intends to send a mission to Iraq to interview those senior Iraqi personnel recently interviewed by Iraq itself as part of its efforts to complete its accounting for its past chemical weapons programme. The aim of this mission would be to try to obtain information that might help the Commission to verify independently, either directly or indirectly, Iraq's account of its programme. Such verification is required to help to ensure that the Commission starts its chemical ongoing monitoring and verification activities using, as far as possible, accurate baseline information. A further team will, in the first week of April, start the destruction of chemical production equipment used in Iraq's former chemical weapons programme, as required by resolution 687 (1991).

10. Thereafter, the Commission intends to launch its first chemical baseline inspections in May 1994. However, the date for launching these inspections is

very much dependent upon Iraq first completing its initial declarations due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the format prepared by the Commission and for all the sites at which the Commission intends to conduct baseline inspections.

11. Also in May 1994, two inspections are planned for the Muthanna facility: one to conduct a survey of the site using analytical instrumentation to ensure that there remain no munitions or chemicals at the site which should be destroyed under the terms of resolution 687 (1991). A second mission will formally close down the Commission's Chemical Destruction Group's operations at the site. This, like the mission described in the preceding paragraph, is aimed at helping to ensure that chemical ongoing monitoring and verification activities start on the correct basis, i.e. one in which Iraq's past chemical weapons capabilities have been fully accounted for and eliminated.

3. Biological activities

12. The Commission plans to launch baseline inspections in the biological area in the second week of April, to include at least all of the sites declared by Iraq in its initial declarations of January 1994. To facilitate these baseline inspections, Iraq has been requested to resubmit in the revised formats as soon as possible its initial declarations in this area. Iraq was also requested to provide a written statement for each site in advance of the inspections, giving an overview of the work and equipment at that site of relevance to ongoing monitoring and verification.

13. The Commission has also planned a number of other activities. In May, it is intended to conduct an inspection to tag key items of equipment identified during the baseline inspections. Also in May, it is intended to hold a series of seminars between Commission personnel and international experts on biological issues. There will be seminars on reviewing the information obtained from the baseline inspections to assess where monitoring and verification effort should be focused in the biological area; sensor technologies that might be of use at biological sites; and a full review of Iraq's past and current biological activities in order to assess whether the Commission has indeed accounted for all the materials and equipment of concern and ensure that these will be adequately monitored under the plans drawn up by the Commission.

14. On the basis of these seminars, a further round of inspections will be conducted at sites identified as key in the biological area in order to complete the site-monitoring and verification protocol-writing process for these sites. Current plans are for that inspection to be launched in June 1994.